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Compensatory and punitive awards were created to serve two separate and
distinct purposes: to compensate the plaintiff for his/her injuries and to punish the
defendant for negligent conduct, respectively. Thus, defendant characteristics should
have no impact on compensatory award decisions. Extensive research, however,
indicates that these extra-legal factors do impact damage awards. The purpose o f this
study was to examine whether varying types of judicial instructions could be used to
reduce the effects o f such extra-legal considerations, particularly a defendant’s status as
an individual or a corporation and defendant reprehensibility. As hypothesized,
participants awarded larger compensatory awards in high reprehensibility conditions than
in low reprehensibility conditions. There was also a trend to award larger sums o f money
when the defendant was a corporation rather than an individual. However, none o f the
four levels o f judicial instructions were shown to counter the impact o f either extra-legal
consideration.
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Countering the Consideration o f Extra-Legal
Factors in Damage Award Decisions
There has been extensive controversy concerning the intricacies o f juror decision
making. One area o f focus in that controversy has been civil damage awards. Many
argue that this is an area in which jurors are allowed too much latitude and must make
important decisions based upon ambiguous instructions. In addition to producing great
variation among award amounts, such ambiguity leaves these award decisions open to the
effects o f extra-legal influences. There is an abundance o f evidence demonstrating that
jurors consider extra-legal factors when making damage award decisions (Wasserman &
Robinson, 1980; Hans & Ermann, 1989; MacCoun, 1996).
As defined by the legal system, compensatory damages are intended to
compensate the plaintiff for any suffered losses. The purpose o f this type o f award is to
bring the plaintiff back to the place where he/she was before the accident.

Therefore,

this type o f award should be based solely on the degree o f injuries suffered by the
plaintiff. Defendant characteristics should have no impact on the amount o f the
compensatory award. Ideally, two similar plaintiffs who suffered from similar injuries
would receive similar compensatory damage awards independent o f the identity or status
o f the defendant. The same accident, leading to the same injuries, should theoretically
produce the same compensatory damages across defendants. This means that similar
damages should be awarded regardless o f factors such as, whether the defendant is a
corporation or an individual, the reprehensibility o f the defendant’s conduct, or the
defendant’s ability to pay a large sum.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to serve as punishment for
wantonly negligent or reckless behavior. This type o f damages should consider only the
conduct and characteristics o f the defendant and should ignore the needs and
characteristics o f the plaintiff.

The severity o f the plaintiffs injuries should have no

l

impact on the amount o f the punitive award. Therefore, if defendant conduct is held
constant across cases then punitive award amounts should be the same, independent o f
the plaintiffs needs or injuries.
In spite o f the legal distinction between the two types o f damage awards and their
differing purposes, jurors generally receive little or no instruction as to how damage
award decisions should be made. Typically, jurors receive no guidelines as to what
factors are appropriate or inappropriate to consider. This study examines whether
additional instructions lead to more legally sound award decisions. Specifically, do
additional instructions that explicitly state what factors are to be considered when making
such decisions reduce the jurors consideration o f extra-legal factors? The extra-legal
factors examined in this experiment are defendant status as a corporation or an individual
and the reprehensibility o f the defendant’s conduct.
Chin and Peterson (1985) questioned whether justice is actually blind to factors
not related to the case in question. The researchers examined verdict data for over 9,000
civil cases in Cook County, Illinois. Their purpose was to determine if, in reality, there
are plaintiffs that are more likely to win (irresistible plaintiffs) or defendants that are
more likely to have large damage awards levied against them (deep pocket defendants).
The deep pocket theory proposes that jurors award larger amounts against defendants that
appear to have more money. Therefore, simply because a defendant has a greater ability
to pay, he will be required to pay larger amounts. Until this point, the idea that such
factors impacted verdicts and damage awards had been liberally claimed, but not
empirically tested.
Based on the Cook County data, Chin and Peterson (1985) did find evidence for
the deep pocket effect. Amounts awarded against corporations were higher than those
awarded against individuals. The authors, however, did point out that the cases involving
corporate defendants also differed from the cases involving individual defendants on

other dimensions. Corporate defendants were more likely to be involved in high stakes
cases and cases with multiple defendants. Using statistical analyses to control for those
factors, a corporate/individual difference was still found. Damage awards were higher
against corporations when the plaintiff suffered injuries that were not severe, but in cases
o f severe injuries the difference became much larger.
A regression model based on the verdict data collected in Cook County, Illinois,
was developed by Hammitt, Carol, and Relies (1985). This model predicts strong
differences in award amounts between suits filed against corporations and suits filed
against individuals. After taking injury and case type into account, the authors predict
that awards against corporations will be 34 percent larger than awards against
individuals. This difference is even more pronounced in cases in which the plaintiff
suffers severe and permanent injuries. In these instances, awards against corporations are
predicted to be 4.5 times higher than awards against individuals.
As is previously summarized, past research in this area has focused on the
examination o f archival data. Though useful, such examinations do not provide
experimenters with the control available in laboratory research. One difficulty
encountered in using procedures involving archival data is the inability to equivocate the
cases. An experimental design allows the experimenter to control all aspects o f the case
and manipulate only the identity of the defendant. Actual cases, on the other hand, will
rarely be so clean-cut. In addition to defendant identity, many other case-unique
characteristics are introduced. The abundance o f such additional characteristics render it
difficult to detect what factors are actually causing the differences and dangerous to draw
too many conclusions based on archival data
Vidmar (1994) warns experimenters o f just such errors. Although data o f this
type provides certain useful information, Vidmar (1994) suggests that experimenters
resist being drawn to archival data merely because it pertains to “real” cases. The author

warns o f the numerous dangers involved in relying solely on research o f archival data.
Not only is it impossible to eliminate alternate hypotheses, but often cases from different
jurisdictions differ on so many dimensions that the cases are no longer even comparable.
These problems underscore the need for laboratory research demonstrating the same
corporate/individual difference found in archival data.
Wasserman and Robinson (1980) conducted a laboratory study examining this
issue. The authors were interested in the effects of nonevidentary influences, particularly
defendant identity and type of evidence, on damage awards. The experimenters asked
participants to award damages in a case in which the defendant was described either as an
average man earning about $30,000 a year, or an average corporation with assets o f about
$2 million. After making individual award decisions, participants were placed into
groups and asked to deliberate and reach a group award decision. Both individual and
group mean awards were higher against the corporate defendant than against the
individual defendant.
A caveat to the authors’ conclusions must be noted. The description in the
individual condition contained the information that the individual did not have an
insurance policy. No such information was given for the corporate defendant. Both
defendant status and insurance coverage or lack thereof are extra-legal influences and
neither should theoretically affect award decisions. For this reason, the evidence does
demonstrate that mock jurors are considering extra-legal factors when making their
decisions. However, it can not be concluded from this study that the large differences in
award amounts are due to a difference in defendant status, as the author asserts, rather
than to the issue o f insurance coverage.
An interest in examining differences in public attitudes concerning corporate and
individual wrongdoing led Hans and Ermann (1989) to conduct a study that lends support
to the corporate versus individual bias. The authors constructed two scenarios describing

workers who developed illnesses after being contracted to perform a job. As a result the
workers brought legal action against the party that hired them. The scenarios were
identical except for the identity of the defendant. Half o f the participants received
scenarios in which the defendant was Mr. Jones, the other half, the Jones Corporation.
Participants were asked to determine liability, damages, and criminal negligence.
Findings in all three categories supported a bias against corporations (Hans &
Ermann, 1989). The Jones Corporation was significantly more likely to be found liable
for plaintiff injuries. Once liability had been established, larger damage awards were
awarded against the corporate defendant than the individual defendant. This difference
was particularly large for pain and suffering damages, which is the category in which
jurors have the most freedom in their award decision. In addition, Mr. Jones was much
less likely then the Jones Corporation to be voted as criminally negligent.
Further attitudinal questions revealed that participants regarded lawsuits against
the corporation as both more fair and more reasonable than the lawsuits against the
individual. Criminal charges were also viewed as more fair when they were brought
against the Jones Corporation than when they were filed against Mr. Jones. Participants
rated the degree o f harm suffered by the workers as the same across groups, but perceived
the actions o f the corporate defendant as much more sinister than the actions o f the
individual defendant. The corporate defendant was found to be “more reckless, more
morally wrong, and more deserving of punishment” than the individual defendant (Hans
& Ermann, 1989, p. 158). Corporations were also rated as more likely to have previously
been aware o f the dangers, less regretful after the incident, and less likely to change their
behavior in the future.
These findings indicate that award discrepancy between corporate and individual
defendants is due to something more intricate than the defendant’s ability to pay.
Although the corporation was seen as having a greater ability to pay awarded damages,

this was far from the only difference found between the two defendants (Hans & Ermann,
1989). The fact that the corporation was generally viewed in a more negative light than
the individual, despite the fact that all case characteristics were identical, suggests that
the public has a much harsher opinion of corporate wrongdoing than o f individual
wrongdoing. These findings led the authors to speculate that much more than a deep
pockets phenomenon was occurring. The authors propose that jurors hold corporations to
a higher standard than individuals and as a result have a more negative view o f corporate
wrongdoing. This less lenient attitude toward corporations then leads to higher damage
awards against corporate defendants.
MacCoun (1996) purports that a flaw in the studies designed to test the deep
pocket hypothesis is the confound o f defendant wealth and defendant identity. It is
reasonable to assume that jurors may perceive corporations as more wealthy than
individuals. For that reason, monetary judgments against corporations may be higher
based on a higher perceived ability to pay rather than as a result o f a bias against
corporate defendants. This idea is consistent with the deep pocket hypothesis. MacCoun
(1996) points out that studies that merely compare corporations and individuals cannot
eliminate the possibility that the award disparity may be a sole function o f perceived
wealth or ability to pay. On the other hand, the disparity may be independent o f
defendant wealth and be attributable to differing perceptions o f corporations and
individuals.
In a study designed to further test the deep pockets phenomenon, MacCoun
(1996) examines whether the noted differences are actually due to the wealth o f the
defendant, as the deep pocket theory would suggest, or instead to the individual/corporate
distinction. In an effort to eliminate this confound, MacCoun (1996) created a design that
included three defendant conditions: a blue-collar individual, a wealthy individual, and a
corporate defendant. Defendant descriptions for the wealthy individual and the corporate

defendant held all characteristics constant except the name o f the defendant. For
example, one case described the defendants as a construction worker (blue-collar
defendant), the owner of a “construction contracting business with many concurrent
projects and a large crew of construction workers” (wealthy individual defendant), or a
corporation that is a “construction contracting business with many concurrent projects
and a large crew o f construction workers” (corporate defendant) (MacCoun, 1996).
Controlling for defendant wealth, MacCoun (1996) found that mock jurors still
gave larger damage awards when the defendant was a corporation, rather than an
individual. This bias against corporations occurred even when the individual was
described as a wealthy individual with the same assets as the corporation. These findings
are not consistent with the deep pocket hypothesis, which has previously been used to
explain the corporate versus individual award differential. If the award decisions were
guided by the defendant’s ability to pay then the judgments against the corporate
defendant and the wealthy individual should be both comparable and significantly higher
than the judgments against the blue-collar individual. Instead, as was the trend in past
research, similar judgments were awarded to the individual defendants with higher
judgments awarded against the corporation.
An empirical examination by Vidmar (1995) did not produce results consistent
with the archival analyses or the previous research in this area. His experiment was
designed to test the notion that medical malpractice cases are somehow treated differently
than other types of cases and that this difference is attributable to the perceived “deep
pockets” o f insurance companies. Vidmar (1995) assigned participants to read either a
malpractice or automobile negligence case that had either one defendant, two defendants,
or a corporate defendant. He found no differences in mean award amounts between
groups.
It is uncertain why Vidmar’s (1995) findings were not consistent with past

research. Due to the medical malpractice focus of Vidmar’s (1995) study, the case
descriptions were somewhat different than the scenarios used in the previously cited
studies. These differences may have somehow influenced award amounts. In the
corporate conditions, the cases depended on the legal doctrine o f vicarious liability in
which employers are responsible for the actions of their employees. Additionally, the
cases were such that in the individual conditions, the defendants actually committed a
negligent act. The injuries were not due to improper corporate policies, but rather due
solely to the actions o f the individual. Therefore, it was not actually the corporation that
committed the injurious act, although the corporation was legally responsible for it.
Under these circumstances, it is not terribly difficult to imagine that the previously
documented difference may be alleviated by a desire to award larger damages against a
defendant that directly committed the act and less against a corporation that was
indirectly responsible for it. However, the award differences found by MacCoun (1996)
were consistent across six different cases, some o f which involved the issue o f vicarious
liability.
There could be numerous reasons why damage award decisions against
corporations are higher than those against individuals. As suggested by Hans and
Ermann (1989), the difference could be attributable to corporations being held to a higher
standard. The attribution theory can account for such a difference in standard. A
corporation is composed of a number of people. A group o f people, due to their
collective resources, may be expected to have greater foresight about such matters than
an individual (Hans & Ermann, 1989). Additionally, it may be easier for jurors to award
large damages against corporations because it is a more impersonal entity than an
individual (MacCoun, 1996). Along the same lines, Hammitt et al. (1985) suggests that
jurors may be balancing the good that the money will do the plaintiff against the harm
that paying the awarded amount will do to the defendant. It may be easier for jurors to

perceive the award as harmful when it is against an individual than when it is against a
corporation.
Regardless of the reason behind this effect, the defendant’s status as a corporation
or individual is a factor that has been shown to be a consideration for the purposes o f
awarding compensatory damages. As previously stated, this runs counter to the legal
purpose o f compensatory damages. Compensatory damages should be based solely on
the plaintiffs injuries and suffering and should not be influenced by defendant
characteristics.
It is also important to perform a conceptual replication o f these findings using a
different characteristic to ensure that these results are not due to something unique in the
corporation/individual characteristic. Another extra-legal factor that may affect damage
award decisions is defendant reprehensibility Cather, Greene, and Durham (1996)
designed a study to investigate whether jurors were basing their damage award decisions
on the appropriate legal factors. The experiment examined the effects o f plaintiff injury
and defendant reprehensibility on award decisions. In accordance with legal doctrine,
plaintiff injury should impact compensatory damages, but not punitive damages. The
opposite trend should be true for defendant reprehensibility; reprehensibility should affect
punitive awards, but not compensatory awards. Participants were given brief instructions
as to the purpose of each type of damages. Although Cather et al. (1996) did not find a
significant difference between awards for high versus low reprehensibility o f defendants,
there was a definite trend in that direction. Across three cases, the mean award amount
for highly reprehensible defendants was $413,000 as opposed to $196,000 for less
reprehensible defendants.
Further evidence in this regard is provided by Wissler, Evans, Hart, Morry, and
Saks (1997). Wissler et al. (1997) examined how fault attributions affected pain and
suffering awards. The authors manipulated the degree of defendant fault and found

marginally significant differences (p=.067) for pain and suffering awards between groups
across the five case scenarios. In addition, for one of the five cases, there were strong
differences between award amounts for very responsible versus less responsible
defendants (p< 001). This indicates that weaker findings may be due to weaker
manipulations or factors specific to the given case summary.
The Hans and Ermann (1989) experiment also lends support to the notion that
defendant reprehensibility influences compensatory award decisions. The authors assert
that these differences may be due to corporations being held to a higher standard than
individuals. Based on this standard, identical actions may be considered more reckless
when committed by a corporation than by an individual. Consistent with that idea, the
conditions in which mock jurors awarded high damages were also the conditions in
which the respondents considered the defendant to be most reckless.
Consideration o f the evidence indicates that despite what is legally intended,
extra-legal factors do play a role in damage award decisions. An interesting question
then becomes, “How can such considerations be countered?” As has been previously
stated, jurors are placed into a role in which they are asked to make extremely important
decisions, but are given very little guidance. Guidance as to what should or should not be
considered when making damage decisions is a matter dealing with juror education and
bias reduction. This information could be presented with ease through judicial
instructions, which are routinely used to inform and educate jurors about various legal
matters.
The traditional method o f dealing with factors that jurors are not supposed to
consider has been to not mention or to ignore those factors. In certain instances, this is a
legitimate method of bias reduction. Courts routinely withhold information from, or
blindfold, juries as a means o f reducing bias. Not informing jurors o f a defendant’s past
criminal record is an example of blindfolding for that purpose. In this example, a bias

would be very likely if the jurors were given that information and blindfolding is a
logical answer. The problem, however, arises when the idea o f not addressing a bias is
applied in situations in which ignoring the bias does not eliminate it. There are some
circumstances in which it would be more beneficial to stop ignoring that jurors may
consider particular factors and instead instruct them otherwise. Not telling a jury whether
a defendant in a motor vehicle accident suit carried insurance is an example of
problematic blindfolding. This information is not given to jurors because it is a factor
that is not supposed to be considered. However, if the matter at hand is something about
which jurors already have established beliefs or expectations, then blindfolding is
unlikely to serve its intended purpose (Diamond & Casper, 1992). In this case, it is
understandable that jurors may assume that the defendant has insurance though he or she
may not. It is also understandable that this assumption may influence jurors damage
award decisions. This illustrates the importance of recognizing and dealing with any
biases that will not be corrected for by simply not addressing those issues with the jurors.
The consideration of extra-legal factors in award decisions has not been
eliminated by ignoring it. Jurors must be informed that such considerations are
inappropriate. In addition, explaining to jurors the purpose o f each type of damages and
the reasons that certain factors should not be considered should lead to better compliance
with the instructions than mere admonitions not to consider those factors (Diamond &
Casper, 1992).
Furthermore, in order for jurors to follow judicial instructions, the instructions
must be clearly written. Clarity o f judicial instructions has been studied across many
legal specters. Juror’s lack of understanding of judicial instructions has been evidenced
in various legal circumstances. Jurors have been shown to be unclear as to the degree of
certainty that is required by the reasonable doubt standard even after receiving specific
judicial instructions (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996). Additionally, Reifman, Gusick,

and Ellsworth (1992) found that jurors understood less than half o f the instructions they
were given. It is therefore evident why such variation in juror decision-making exists. It
is also evident that jurors are in need o f clear, concise instructions. This study attempts to
reduce award variation and consideration o f extra-legal factors by providing jurors with
brief, yet concise instructions concerning what should and should not be considered in
compensatory damage award decisions.
The literature has also speculated as to the effects o f including specific examples
injudicial instructions. In particular, the death qualification literature raises the concern
that if jurors are given a list of mitigators, they may interpret the listed mitigators as the
only mitigators they are allowed to consider. This concern also arises when constructing
judicial instructions as to what may and may not be considered when awarding civil
damages. This study incorporates this concern into the design by creating two conditions
that list examples. In one example condition, one of the factors that is being examined
(corporate/individual status) will be included as an example in the list, but the other
factor (defendant reprehensibility) will not The other example condition will be the
opposite. Defendant reprehensibility will be included as an example in the list, but
corporate/individual status will not. All other examples in the list will remain the same.
Additionally, the two variations of the example condition are needed to ensure
that the instructions are not having an undesired effect. It is possible that listing factors,
such as defendant’s corporate status, may make that factor more salient and thus increase
the chances that it will influence decision-making. This would result in an even greater
disparity in awards between the two types of defendants. By creating two example
conditions, one in which the defendant’s status is given and one in which it is not, this
possibility can be examined and ruled out.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether differing types o f judicial
instructions can reduce the differences in damage awards that result from the

consideration o f extra-legal factors. Consistent with past studies, it is expected that both
corporate status of the defendant and defendant reprehensibility will influence
compensatory and punitive award decisions. Four levels o f instruction (pattern
instructions, expanded instructions, and expanded instructions with examples including
or not including the factor in question) will be incorporated to determine whether judicial
instructions can counter the disparity in compensatory awards.
The pattern instructions typically given to jurors in civil cases, do not provide
clear instruction as to what information may be employed in damage award decisions.
As a result, jurors must make their decisions based on the information that they are given
which has been shown to result in the improper consideration of extra-legal factors. It is
understandable that in the face of unclear or confusing instructions, jurors would rely on
what they know, primarily that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious or that the
defendant is a large or wealthy corporation. Expanding on judicial instructions should
provide jurors with a better framework of how their decisions should be made and as
such, redirect their attention to the allowed and pertinent considerations. As the
framework becomes more clear and detailed, the reliance on extra-legal information
should be lessened. Therefore, with each increase in instruction clarity, a reduction in
extra-legal considerations is expected. Based on the previously mentioned evidence, the
expected findings are as follows.
Hypothesis I: Extra-legal factors, such as corporate/individual status and
defendant reprehensibility, will impact compensatory damage awards when no
judicial instructions not to consider those factors are given.
Hypothesis 2: Expanded instructions as to the purpose of each type o f damages
are not sufficiently clear and will not be effective in eliminating the consideration
o f extra-legal factors in damage award decisions.
Hypothesis 3: The addition of examples to the expanded instructions will provide

more clear and concise instruction for jurors and will reduce the consideration of
extra-legal factors in damage award decisions. This will occur regardless o f
whether the extra-legal factors present in the case scenario are listed in the
example list.
Method
Participants
With the help of the Broward County clerk, one hundred eighty-two volunteers
were recruited from the jury pool in Broward County, Florida between January, 2000 and
March, 2000. Fifty-two percent of the participants were male, 79% Caucasian, 10%
Hispanic, and 10% African American. The median age o f the sample was 50-59 and the
median annual household income was $45,000-$60,000.
Materials and Design
This experiment incorporated a 2 X 2 X 4 (Corporate Status X Reprehensibility X
Instruction Type) between-subjects, fully-crossed design in which each participant
received one level o f each independent variable The survey consisted o f a civil case
summary followed by a brief questionnaire. The summary described a personal injury
civil court case in which an individual was injured when a shelf collapsed on him as he
was browsing in a hardware store (see Appendix A). The materials included the
information that a determination of liability had been made. This information was
followed by a request to award compensatory and punitive damages based upon the
information provided in the summary. Judge’s instructions were given to guide the
participants in their decision-making. As is the practice in actual cases, the survey
allowed the participants to award compensatory damages in individual categories. The
four compensatory award categories included in this experiment were as follows:
medical expenses, loss o f wages, pain and suffering, and loss of capacity for the
enjoyment o f life. This was followed by an opportunity to award punitive damages.

Attached was a two-page questionnaire composed o f 9-point Likert scale-type opinion
and attitude items concerning the case and the litigants followed by a basic demographic
questionnaire (see Appendix C).
All information concerning the plaintiff, the incident in question, and the injuries
sustained remained constant across conditions. The case scenarios between conditions
differed on three dimensions: the status o f the defendant (corporation or individual), the
degree o f defendant reprehensibility, and the type o f judicial instructions. H alf o f the
respondents received a summary in which the defendant was identified as Mr. Maxwell.
The other half of the participants received questionnaires that identified the defendant as
Maxwell Corporation. There were two reprehensibility levels, high and low, which were
manipulated by altering the defendant’s pre-accident conduct (what precautions were
taken, what policies were held and followed, etc.).
The manipulation of judge’s instructions was divided into four levels (see
Appendix B). The first level provided basic judicial instructions with no instructions as
to what could and could not be considered when determining damage awards. These
instructions were taken from the pattern instructions that jurors are currently given in this
type o f case and as such served as a baseline as to the information on which jurors are
currently basing their award decisions. In addition to the information given in the first
level o f instructions, the second level provided more in-depth guidelines as to what were
proper and improper considerations for each type of damage award. However, this level
of instruction gave no examples of those considerations. The third and fourth levels
provided the pattern instructions from the first level, the in-depth guidelines from the
second level, and gave examples of what type of considerations were inappropriate. One
o f the example levels included whether the defendant was a corporation or individual as
an example in the example list, but did not include defendant reprehensibility. Likewise,
the other example level included defendant reprehensibility as an example in the example

list, but did not include corporate status of the defendant.
Procedure
The experimenter was allowed to recruit participants from the excess
venirepersons that remained in the jury pool at the end of each day. Participants were
advised that a study was being conducted for educational purposes and that the goal of
the study was to examine jury decision-making, particularly in civil cases. They were
informed that their participation was completely voluntary and were told that they would
be asked to read a civil case summary, award damages based upon that summary, and
complete a short questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to groups (with 1113 persons in each group) and given a complete questionnaire. After completing the
questionnaire, participants were allowed to ask the experimenter questions and when any
questions had been answered, participants were thanked and excused.
Results
Compensatory damage award data was analyzed using a 2 X 2 X 4 (Corporation
X Reprehensibility X Instruction Type) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As was
previously stated, the compensatory damage awards were broken down into four
categories. For the purpose of analysis, those categories were summed to form a total
compensatory award which was used as the dependent measure. The analysis
demonstrated a significant main effect for defendant reprehensibility (F=5.826, p<01),
with a mean compensatory award for high reprehensibility (M =$706,164.30)
significantly higher than the mean compensatory award for low reprehensibility
(M=$420,294.03). There was also a marginal main effect for status as a corporation or
individual (F=3.174, p<.077), with a mean compensatory award for corporate defendants
(M=$668,731.06) higher than the mean compensatory award for individual defendants
(M=$457,727.27)(see Appendix D). There was no main effect for instruction type and no
interactions were significant.

A 2 X 2 X 4 (Corporation X Reprehensibility X Instruction Type) analysis o f
variance (ANOVA) was also used to analyze punitive damage awards. As in the
compensatory analysis, there was a significant main effect for defendant reprehensibility,
F=8.293, p<.005, with a mean punitive award for high reprehensibility (M=$559,930.87)
significantly higher than the mean punitive award for low reprehensibility
(M=$27,357.96).

In addition, the main effect for defendant’s status as a corporation or

individual was also significant, F=4.203, p< 042, with a mean punitive award for
corporate defendants (M=$483,210.23) higher than the mean punitive award for
individual defendants (M=$104,078.60)(see Appendix D). Again, no main effects for
instruction type were found. This analysis did demonstrate a marginally significant
Corporation X Reprehensibility interaction, F=3 .234, p<074. No other interactions were
significant.
Discussion
As expected, both the defendant’s status as a corporation or an individual and the
degree o f defendant reprehensibility were shown to effect punitive damage awards.
Punitive awards were higher when the defendant was a corporation as opposed to an
individual. Higher awards were also given against more reprehensible defendants as
opposed to less reprehensible defendants. The highest mean punitive awards were
awarded when the defendant was identified as a corporation whose conduct was highly
reprehensible. This demonstrates that mock jurors are considering defendant
characteristics when making punitive award decisions. This is consistent with the legally
intended purpose of punitive awards, which is to punish defendants for negligent conduct.
It is both a reasonable and a desirable effect to see that defendants who act in a more
reprehensible manner will be punished with higher damage awards.
However, the results also indicate that mock jurors also consider these defendant
characteristics when awarding compensatory damages. This finding is not consistent

with the legally intended purpose of compensatory awards, which is solely to make the
plaintiff whole again. Participants awarded higher compensatory damages when the
defendant was a corporation rather than an individual, and when the defendant’s actions
were highly reprehensible. In essence, the mock jurors seem to be using both types of
damages to punish the defendants for the incident. This occurred even in conditions in
which the mock jurors received instructions not to consider defendant characteristics and
were given those specific characteristics as examples o f improper considerations. None
o f the instructions employed corrected for jurors’ extra-legal considerations.
These results indicate that jurors tend to consider the same factors when making
each type o f award decision, despite the fact that the categories of damages were created
to serve separate purposes. Judicial instructions did not correct this problem - a finding
that is not surprising in the light of judicial instruction research in the areas o f pretrial
publicity and instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence. It still appears that jurors
either do not understand or choose to ignore the differing purposes of each type of award
and what factors they should consider when making each award decision. It is possible
that the instructions were not carefully read or did not provide sufficiently clear
explanations as to how the decisions should be made. As an oversight o f the
experimenter, instruction comprehension was not measured. For this reason, it is not
possible to determine whether the participants even read the instructions, much less
understood and attempted to follow them. It would be interesting to examine whether
more in-depth instructions could succeed in clarifying jurors’ misunderstandings in this
regard.
It was hypothesized in this experiment that if jurors understood that the two types
o f damages were developed to serve separate purposes and thus were made to be based
on separate considerations, then they would be more likely to make more legally sound
decisions. This hypothesis was based on the intuitive, yet empirically unfounded premise

that education on the law would lead to a higher standard in upholding the law.
However, contrary to the previous optimism of the experimenter, judicial instructions
have not been shown to have considerable impact injury decision-making.
Another explanation for the failure of judicial instructions to have an effect may
be seen by examining the type of task the jurors are asked to perform. It is generally
accepted that jurors take their duty very seriously and are quite motivated to make the
right decision. However, by asking jurors to fully compartmentalize these two award
types and maintain full control over what aspects of the case affect their decision-making,
the courts may be asking jurors to complete a task that simply is not within human
abilities. If that is the case and it is impossible for persons to set such clear mental
boundaries as to what influences their decisions, then regardless o f instruction clarity, the
consideration of extra-legal factors will not be eliminated.
Judicial instructions are the most plausible method available to correct for extralegal considerations.

Studies incorporating a stronger manipulation of judicial

instructions can determine whether that method will be fruitful. Further studies are
needed to determine if it is indeed possible to correct for the consideration o f such
factors. Allowing attorney’s an extended voir dire in an attempt to further educate jurors
on this matter is another method that may be tested. If it is found that individuals are
unable to make decisions not influenced by these factors, even when they have a clear
understanding of how the decisions should be made, then even the most eloquent and
concise judicial instructions or the most intense voir dire will have no bearing on award
decisions.
Upon further examination, it may be discovered that the courts are, in essence,
asking jurors to do the impossible. If that is the case, less traditional methods o f bias
reduction, must be sought out and tested. One such less traditional method would be to
assign separate juries to make each type of award decision with each jury being given

only the information that they are legally allowed to consider in making their decision. In
addition, it may be found that the best way to eliminate or control for the bias may be to
collapse the compensatory and punitive damage awards into a single type o f damage
award in which all o f the pertinent factors may be considered.
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Case Scenario
The following excerpt provides information about a civil court case. Please read the
information carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Richard Davis, a 43 year-old contractor, was doing business at Maxwell’s
Hardware. As he was comparing items from an upper shelf, several shelves collapsed on
Mr. Davis, resulting in severe and permanent injuries. As a result of the accident, Mr.
Davis, who previously earned about $40,000 per year, incurred $15,000 in medical bills
and now has difficulty working. Thus, Mr. Davis brought a lawsuit against Maxwell’s
Hardware.
M axwell’s Hardware is owned by the defendant [corporation], Mr. Charles
Maxwell [Maxwell Corporation], Safety studies have been conducted to determine the
maximum weight that can safely be placed on the shelves. Mr. Maxwell [The
corporation] adhered to [ignored] the maximum weight limits and did not [routinely]
overloaded] the shelves. In addition, Mr. Maxwell [the corporation] performed periodic
[has never performed any type of] safety checks to ensure that the shelves were safely
mounted.

Levels of Instruction
Pattern Instructions
Judge s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s
negligence.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those
damages, are within your discretion.
Expanded Instructions
Judge’s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s
negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or
return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be used to
punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent o f Mr. Davis’
needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may
not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff s needs or injuries.
Expanded Instructions with Reprehensibility Example
Judge’s Instructions: 1 will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result o f the defendant’s
negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or
return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be used to
punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis
needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may
not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant, such as the defendant s

assets, ability to pay, or the offensiveness of the defendant’s conduct.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr Davis entitled, you may, but are
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff s needs or injuries.
Expanded Instructions with Corporate/Individual Example
Judge’s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your
decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It
is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly
compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result o f the defendant’s
negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or
return him to his state prior to the accident This type of damages is not to be used to
punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis’
needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder o f his life. You may
not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant, such as the defendant’s
assets, ability to pay, or whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are
not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiffs needs or injuries.

Questionnaire
Please answer the follow opinion items.
1. What is your opinion of the defendant?
Very
1
Negative

2

3

4

5

7

Very
Positive

2. How offensive was the behavior of the defendant?
Very
1
Negative

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Positive

7

N ot At

3. How foreseeable was this accident?
Veiy
1
Foreseeable
4.

2

3

4

A ll Foreseeable

How thorough were the precautions taken by the defendant?

Very
1
Thorough

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

N ot At
All Thorough

5. How would you rate the defendant’s ability to pay the awarded amount?
Very
Able

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

N ot At
A ll Able

6. How likely is it that the awarded amount will cause a financial hardship for the
defendant?
Very
Likely

1

2

3

4

5

7

Not At
A ll Likely

7

Not At

7. How suspicious are you of persons who sue^
Very

1

2

3

4

5

6

A ll Suspicious

Suspicious

Please answer the following demographic questions.
8. Sex:

Male
Female

_____

9.

Race:

10. Age:

White/Non-Hispanic
White/Hispanic
Hispanic/Black
Black
Other
50-59
60+

18-29_____
30 -3 9 _____
40-49

11. Marital Status.

1. never married
2. divorced
3. married
4. widow/ widower

12. Education Level 1. less than high school graduate
2. high school graduate
3. some college
4. college degree
5. post-graduate college work or degree

14. Occupation:

1.
2.
3.
4.

1.F u ll-T im e ______
2. Part-Time

Laborer
Sales
Service
Clerical

_

13. Employment Status:

3. Retired
4. Unemployed

5. Professional
6. Student
7. Unemployed
8. Retired

15. Aside from your political affiliation, how would you evaluate your political views?
1. Liberal
2. Somewhat liberal

_____

3 Somewhat conservative
4. Conservative

_____
--------

16. Please indicate your annual family income
under $15,000_____
$45,001-$60,000 _____

$15,001-$30,000_____
$60,001-$70,000_____

$30,001-$45,000
Above $71,000 _

17. Have you ever served on a civil or criminal jury?
1.
Yes, Civil
2.
Yes, Criminal
3.
No, Never
18. Have you ever been a party in a lawsuit?
1.
Yes, I have sued someone
2.
Yes, I have been sued
3.
Yes, I have both sued someone and been sued
4.
No, I have never been involved
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